Today, we worked, with the help of ioerror on IRC, on reducing the attack surface in our fetcher methods.
There are three things that we looked at:
1. Reducing privileges by setting a new user and group
2. chroot()
3. seccomp-bpf sandbox
Today, we implemented the first of them. Starting with 1.1~exp3, the APT directories /var/cache/apt/archives and /var/lib/apt/lists are owned by the “_apt” user (username suggested by pabs). The methods switch to that user shortly after the start. The only methods doing this right now are: copy, ftp, gpgv, gzip, http, https.
If privileges cannot be dropped, the methods will fail to start. No fetching will be possible at all.
Known issues:
- We drop all groups except the primary gid of the user
- copy breaks if that group has no read access to the files
We plan to also add chroot() and seccomp sandboxing later on; to reduce the attack surface on untrusted files and protocol parsing.
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